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Abstract 
In this article we examine the effect of the recent economic crisis on political participation levels 
in Europe. As the civic voluntarism model and grievances theory predict different effects of 
economic downturn on political participation, the crisis provides us with a unique context to 
evaluate the explanatory power of these two theories. We find that, when investigating a period 
of eight years (2002-2010), economic growth is positively associated with non-institutionalised 
political participation, which is in line with the civic voluntarism model. However, when focusing 
on the changes in political participation that occurred between 2008 and 2010 we find that rising 
unemployment is associated with rising levels of non-institutionalised political participation, 
suggesting that grievance theory is especially useful in exceptionally negative conditions as 
suddenly imposed grievances can lead to various forms of protest behaviour. We argue that these 
shock experiences can lead to momentary peak periods of mobilisation. 
Keywords: economic crisis, political participation, grievance theory, civic voluntarism model, 
European Social Survey 
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Introduction 
The financial and economic crisis that emerged in Europe in 2008 led to the loss of millions of 
jobs resulting in a rising unemployment rate (Verick 2009; De Grauwe and Ji 2013). Especially in 
countries that were worst hit by the economic crisis, massive protests erupted as governments 
and the European Union apparently were being held responsible for their lack of determination 
to address this financial crisis (Anduiza et al. 2013; Hooghe 2012). Based on the literature on 
political mobilization, however, it is not clear whether the emergence of an economic crisis 
stimulates or depresses political participation. Advocates of grievance theory would argue that 
threatened economic interests function as a major incentive for political engagement (Gamson 
1968; Wilkes 2004). The civic voluntarism model, on the other hand, would predict that the 
economic crisis will have a negative effect on the availability of resources that are required to 
participate in politics (Verba et al. 1995). 
It is clear that both approaches lead to contrasting assumptions about the impact of the 
economic crisis on participation levels. Grievance theory has a long tradition within the social 
movement literature (Barnes et al. 1979; Gamson 1968; Geschwender 1968; Gurr 1970; 
Runciman 1966). The basic idea in grievance theory is that personal dissatisfaction and grievances 
stimulate political participation and particularly protest behaviour. Grievances can be defined as 
‘feelings of dissatisfaction with important aspects of life’ (Klandermans et al. 2001, 42) such as 
living standard, income, employment, etc. The recent economic crisis offers a good case to test 
the validity of grievance theory as the economic downturn is likely to lead to the occurrence of 
grievances that stimulate actors to voice their discontent. On the other hand, however, it has 
been documented repeatedly that actors require resources to be able to participate politically. In 
particular, the civic voluntarism model states that there will be a positive relationship between having 
access to material resources and the level of political activity. Hence, both approaches lead to 
different expectations. While grievance theory predicts that scarcity of resources will be 
associated with grievances and protest, the civic voluntarism model leads to the hypothesis that a 
lack of material resources will depress levels of participation.  
In this article, our aim is to ascertain whether these approaches help us to understand the effect 
of the economic crisis that emerged in 2008 on political participation levels. The crisis provides 
us with an extraordinary opportunity to test the effect of economic indicators on participation 
patterns. In order to test whether economic grievances are indeed associated with higher levels of 
political participation, we use cumulative data from the European Social Survey (ESS 2002-2010) 
and from the World Bank. Combining these datasets offers us the opportunity to compare the 
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situation before the crisis with the situation up to 2010.1 Conducting a multilevel analysis allows 
us to examine whether the effects of economic crisis on political participation vary for the 26 
countries included in the ESS. We will investigate a broad set of participation forms that, in line 
with the theoretical literature, can be classified in two broad categories: institutionalised and non-
institutionalised forms of political participation (Stolle and Hooghe 2011). This distinction can 
essentially be traced back to the classical distinction between conventional and unconventional 
forms of political participation (Barnes and Kaase 1979). However, as Marien et al. (2010) point 
out, numerous unconventional forms of political participation have become mainstream over the 
years with as a result that the degree of institutionalization of participation acts now should be 
regarded as the main classification criterion (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001; Dalton 1996, 2000). 
Institutionalised forms of political participation are related to the electoral process and organized 
by the political system (Hooghe and Quintelier 2014). Non-institutionalised forms of political 
participation, on the other hand, represent potentially elite-challenging forms of political 
participation which are not organized by the political system. As grievance theory deals mainly 
with protest behaviour, we can expect that economic downturn will be positively associated 
mainly with non-institutionalised forms of political participation. 
In the following sections, we first briefly review the literature on grievance theory and the civic 
voluntarism model. Subsequently, we present data and methods, before we elaborate on what the 
results imply for the evolution and nature of political participation in Europe. 
 
Economic indicators and political participation 
Political participation can be considered as essential for the legitimacy of democratic political 
systems. Verba et al. (1995, 1) boldly state: ‘democracy is unthinkable without the ability of 
citizens to participate freely in the governing process’. Schlozman et al. (1999) enumerate three 
main reasons to attach a positive normative status to political participation. First of all, the act of 
political participation will have positive consequences for the participants themselves, as it 
contributes to the development of their individual capacities and sense of political self-efficacy. 
Second, political participation has a positive effect on democratic orientations and skills that 
facilitate cooperation within communities and the production of public goods. Finally, political 
participation serves as a vehicle through which citizens communicate their interests, needs and 
preferences and through which they put pressure on public officials to take those interests into 
account. Therefore, almost all of the literature, will agree on the claim that high levels of political 
4 
 
participation are to be preferred from a democratic point of view. There is quite some anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that the economic crisis has led to an upsurge of protest behaviour in 
Europe, especially in the countries of Southern Europe that were hit most severely by economic 
hardship and rising unemployment rates. In Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy, demonstrators 
have massively taken to the streets to express their frustration on the way their governments 
handle the economic crisis. In this study, the main question we want to investigate is whether 
these protest actions have been an ephemeral phenomenon, or whether we can actually discern a 
structural impact of the economic crisis on participation patterns in Europe. 
Grievance theory provides valuable insights into the relation between economic hardship and 
political participation (Barnes et al. 1979; Gamson 1968; Gurr 1970). The grievances model predicts 
that grievances are a strong incentive for collective action and protest behaviour if they are 
translated into political demands (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013; Wilkes 2004). Rising 
poverty and unemployment levels therefore should lead to more protest. The grievance model, 
however, is not just based on the absolute level of hardship, but can also be based on the relative 
level of perceived deprivation (Klandermans et al. 2008). Relative deprivation is defined as the 
perceived discrepancy between the expectations of actors about the goods and conditions of life 
to which they believe they are justifiably entitled, on the one hand, and the degree to which they 
think they can obtain and keep these goods and conditions on the other hand (Gurr 1970). 
Citizens compare their own situation with specific expectations such as their past or their 
expected future situation, the situation of reference persons or a normative standard such as 
social justice or norms of equity (Folger 1986; Klandermans et al. 2001; van Stekelenburg and 
Klandermans 2013). If this comparison leads to the conclusion that one is not receiving what one 
is legitimately entitled to, feelings of relative deprivation arise. Relative deprivation, therefore, can 
be based on a number of causes, like an absolute or relative decline in the rate of social and 
economic progress, the collapse of established patterns of community organization and belief 
systems and a perceived or real incapability of governments to maintain social order or to take 
necessary measures to return to it (Gurr 1970).  
It is a very likely assumption that an economic crisis will strengthen feelings of relative 
deprivation. The fact that the economic crisis developed so rapidly, with rather dramatic 
economic and social consequences, renders it likely that this crisis will lead to ‘suddenly imposed 
grievances’ (Walsh 1981), that are expected to lead most strongly to protest behaviour. Within the 
European Union average unemployment rate rose from 6.7 per cent in March 2008 to 8.9 per 
cent in May 2009 leaving at that time, 21.5 million EU citizens without a job. Rising levels of 
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unemployment and job insecurity can be associated with feelings of relative deprivation in two 
different ways (Kelly and Breinlinger 1996; Klandermans et al. 2001; Klandermans et al. 2008; 
Runciman 1966). On the one hand, individuals affected by the worsening condition on the job 
market might experience individual relative deprivation, meaning that they are personally affected by 
the consequences of the economic crisis (e.g. loss of income, job security, housing, social status). 
This form of deprivation is based on a personal comparison as the individual feels that s/he is 
deprived relative to the generalized other. On the other hand, rising unemployment can also lead 
to group or collective relative deprivation, i.e. the assessment that one’s social group is deprived of what 
it is legitimately entitled to relative to other groups. This type of deprivation emerges when the 
members of a group perceive that ‘social forces are developing in a way that will prevent them 
from realizing their interests’ (Van Dyke and Soule 2002, 499). Collective relative deprivation 
increases the likelihood to engage in various forms of political participation, whereas individual 
relative deprivation rather leads to individual responses (Kawakami and Dion 1995; Kelly and 
Breinlinger 1996; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Smith and Ortiz 2002).  
These different reactions to deprivation can be explained by different causal attributions that are 
made. Individual relative deprivation tends to be attributed to one’s own personal characteristics 
and limitations. Therefore, individuals are likely to choose individual strategies to improve their 
situation. However, if individuals are convinced that their fellow group members share their 
ordeal it is rendered more likely that they do not feel personally responsible. Instead, the 
responsibility for this grievance is attributed externally (Appelgryn and Nieuwoudt 1988; Kelly 
and Breinlinger 1996; Klandermans 1997). With regard to collective deprivation it can be 
expected that the collective assessment of the economic crisis in a particular country affects levels 
of political participation. Consequently, we can expect that especially in countries that were 
strongly affected by the economic crisis, collective relative deprivation is associated with an 
increase in levels of political participation (Kriesi 2012). In line with this reasoning we expect a 
contextual effect of the crisis on levels of political participation. Following the theory on 
collective relative deprivation, this reasoning leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positive relation between economic crisis and the level of political participation. 
It has been argued that the individuals who are most likely to become engaged in collective action 
are those who perceive a combination of individual and collective deprivation (Foster and 
Matheson 1995; Runciman 1966; Walsh 1981). Foster and Matheson (1995, 1173) suggest this 
double relative deprivation reflects ‘a qualitatively different experience’ compared to individual 
relative deprivation. It is suggested that when individuals realize that deprivation occurs not only 
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to themselves but also to other members of the group, their motivation to become involved in 
collective action increases. Thereby they stress that the double deprivation does not result from 
simply adding up individual and collective deprivation, it rather originates from a multiplicative 
interaction between the two types of relative deprivation. Following this logic we expect that in 
counties that have suffered strongly as a result of the economic crisis, especially those who have 
personally experienced deprivation will be most likely to participate. For those individuals 
collective deprivation becomes immediately relevant to their own situation and for them ‘the 
personal becomes political’ (Foster and Matheson 1995, 1168). In line with this reasoning we test 
the following hypothesis: 
H2: The positive relation between economic crisis and the level of political participation becomes stronger for 
individuals who also experience personal deprivation.  
The civic voluntarism model, on the other hand, leads to a contrasting set of expectations. One of the 
most important determinants of political action is the availability of resources (Brady et al. 1995). 
As such, this approach can be interpreted as being indebted to the insights of the older resource 
mobilisation theory, that emphasized that social movement organisations are confronted with the 
task of mobilising sufficient material resources to lead to protest behaviour (McCarthy and Zald 
1977; Obershall 1973). Although this approach was later on criticized for starting from a narrow 
instrumental outlook on protest behaviour (Buechler 1993), the fundamental insight that 
participation does require the presence of at least some level of material resources has been taken 
up in subsequent research, most notably in the civic voluntarism model. The civic voluntarism 
model states that citizens who have time, money and the civic skills to be active in politics will 
use these resources to become more active (Berinsky 2002). Access to money and other material 
resources therefore should be associated with higher levels of political participation (Verba et al. 
1995). This model challenges the claim that economic grievances will stimulate political 
participation. Given that the available pool of resources is shrinking in times of economic 
hardship, the civic voluntarism model would predict that political participation declines. In 
economically difficult periods, citizens might increasingly focus on their own situation rather than 
spending their shrinking pool of resources on political involvement (Muñoz et al. 2014). Hence, 
in times of economic hardship, with lower income levels, raising poverty rates and loss of 
employment (de Beer 2012), citizens are assumed to withdraw from the political arena. This 
argumentation leads to the third, competing, hypothesis: 
H3: There is a negative relation between economic crisis and the level of political participation.  
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In sum, based on grievance theory we expect the economic crisis to trigger feelings of relative 
deprivation which are translated in increased political participation. However, the economic crisis 
reduces the available resources for political participation challenging this prediction of increased 
participation. Therefore, using the case of the recent economic crisis, we investigate which of 
these two competing theories is best able to predict the effect of the crisis on participation levels. 
These hypotheses will be tested, using data from the European Social Survey and from the World 
Bank. 
 
Data, Method and Measurement 
We rely on data from the European Social Survey (ESS) for individual level data and on World 
Bank for country level data. The ESS is a representative, biannual and comparative cross-
sectional survey, which started in 2002 and is conducted in more than twenty European 
countries. The ESS was chosen as a data source because it contains a wide range of indicators for 
political participation, because the data are comparable over time as well as across the different 
countries and because the ESS is known for its high standards concerning survey design and data 
collection (ESS 2010; Lynn 2003). In particular, we will explain changes in the levels of political 
participation based on changes in economic indicators. The dataset includes information from 
the 26 countries for which we have data for the fifth round of the ESS (2010): Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Russian Federation, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. 
The data structure is hierarchical as individuals are nested within countries. Such a hierarchical 
data structure requires multilevel modelling (Snijders and Bosker 1999). Ignoring the hierarchical 
nature of the data would result in underestimated standard errors which might lead to type I 
errors (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Apart from its ability to estimate standard errors correctly, 
multilevel modelling also allows us to determine the direct effects of the country-level 
explanatory variables while controlling for the individual characteristics of the respondents. As 
the dependent variables are binary (participating versus not participating) we use logistic 
multilevel models. Before we proceed with the construction of these multilevel models we offer a 
description of the variables included in the analysis.  
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Dependent Variable: Political Participation 
In line with the literature on political participation we distinguish institutionalised from non-
institutionalised political participation. The European Social Survey contains items for both types 
of political participation. Respondents were asked whether they participated in the following 
forms of engagement during the last 12 months: contacting a politician or other government 
official, working in a political party or political action group, signing a petition, taking part in 
lawful public demonstrations and boycotting certain products. Moreover, the respondents were 
asked whether they are a member of a political party. In order to evaluate the dimensionality of 
this set of six indicators, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted (see Table 1).  
Table 1. Exploratory factor analysis of the political participation scale 
Indicator Factor 1 
Institutionalised 
Factor 2 Non-
institutionalised 
Uniqueness 
Contacted a politician 0.485 0.262 0.571 
Worked in a political party/ action group 0.852 0.131 0.147 
Signed a petition -0.015 0.767 0.424 
Taken part in demonstration 0.115 0.624 0.525 
Boycotted certain products -0.070 0.676 0.585 
Party member 0.893 -0.156 0.315 
 
Note: Entries are the result of exploratory factor analysis with the restriction to retain two factors based on 
Eigenvalues and Promax rotation. Factor loadings >0.6 are in boldface. Since the participation variables are 
dichotomous, the exploratory factor analysis has been accomplished based on a tetrachoric correlation matrix 
(Gorsuch 1974). Source: ESS, 2002-2010. 
 
The results of this factor analysis show that contacting a politician is the only item where factor 
loadings are lower than 0.6. For this reason, contacting a politician is left out for further analysis. 
By contrast, the other items load highly on one of the two factors and so we find empirical 
evidence for a distinction between institutionalised (Factor 1) and non-institutionalised political 
participation (Factor 2). Working for a political party or action group and being a member of a 
political party load on Factor 1, while signing a petition, taking part in a lawful demonstration as 
well as boycotting certain products load on Factor 2. Cross-loadings remain limited.  
Based on these results we constructed two sum scales and, because of the skewed distribution, 
subsequently dichotomized both variables, distinguishing those respondents who were active in 
at least one of the participation forms during the past year (coded 1) from those who did not 
engage in any form of participation in that period (coded 0). These binary variables for 
institutionalised and non-institutionalised political participation, which vary quite substantively 
across the 26 European countries (Figure 1), are used as dependent variables. The Figure shows 
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that participation levels tend to be highest in the Scandinavian countries, while they are lower in 
Southern and Eastern Europe. 
 
Figure 1. Average political participation per country (ESS 2002-2010) 
 
Note: Average percentage of the respondents participating in institutionalised and non-institutionalised forms of 
political participation (2002-2010), 26 countries, European Social Survey Cumulative File (2002-2010). Data are 
weighted with design weights. 
 
Independent Variables: Measuring the Economic Crisis and Economic 
Development 
To assess the impact of the economic crisis, we included four objective country-level measures 
and four individual-level measures. First, we attempt to assess economic development more 
generally, over a period of eight years. Therefore we have included two measures that capture the 
fluctuation of the unemployment rate from its mean and of GDP per capita from its mean during 
the 2002-2010 period. Including the deviation from the country-specific mean allows us to 
include change over time, while disregarding the absolute level of unemployment or GDP/capita 
for that specific country. Second, we include the change in the unemployment rate and the 
change in the growth rate of real GDP per capita (annual accounts, in hundreds of dollar) for the 
most acute phase of the economic crisis, i.e., the 2009-2010 period. For the change in 
unemployment we rely on the national unemployment rates in percentage of the total labour 
force. Both measures are obtained from the World Development Indicator Dataset of the World 
Bank (2014). Whereas the dependent variables for political participation are measured in 2010, we 
include time-lagged indicators for the economic crisis, in order to strengthen the causal 
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inferences: the positive or negative changes in the unemployment rate between 2009 and 2010 
and, the change in GDP per capita between 2009 and 2010. 
In order to measure the effect of the economic crisis on the individual level, we include four 
variables. Two of them (the level of education and satisfaction with income) seem particularly 
relevant for the civic voluntarism model whereas the other two (satisfaction with the functioning 
of the economy and an individual’s position in the labour force) appear more suitable to evaluate 
the effect of deprivation on an individual level. First, we include an individual’s level of 
education, as those with higher education credentials on average also have a more privileged 
access to resources. We recoded this variable into three broad categories: 1) no formal or only 
primary education, 2) secondary education and 3) tertiary education. Second, we include 
respondents’ satisfaction with their family income, which serves as proxy for actual family 
income. We opted for this measurement because the direct question on the total household 
income is plagued by high rates of item non-response.  
Third, we include an individual’s satisfaction with the general state of the economy, assuming that 
respondents that suffer personally as a result of the economic crisis will be less satisfied with the 
state of the economy in their country compared to those who were not personally affected. 
Finally, we include a categorical variable for the respondent’s position in the labour market. This 
variable is recoded in such a manner that respondents who are in paid work form the reference 
category whereas the other three categories are dummy coded. These three dummies capture: 1) 
students2 , 2) the unemployed and 3) respondents who are not part of the labour force such as 
people doing housework3. In the context of the relative deprivation theory, the unemployed are 
of particular interest as they can be directly affected by the crisis. However, we do not know 
whether respondents lost their job coinciding with the economic crisis that started in 2008. In the 
analysis of political participation in 2010 we therefore provide a more precise estimate by 
distinguishing between those who became unemployed since the crisis started in 2008 and those 
where already unemployed at that moment of time. Our assumption is that the long-term 
unemployed, who have lost their job long before the economic crisis of 2008, are less likely to 
identify as a ‘victim’ of this specific crisis period since long term unemployment cannot be 
considered as a ‘suddenly imposed’ grievance. 
Control Variables 
On the individual level, we control for characteristics that previously were found to be related to 
political participation. We control for sex since previous studies have shown that men are more 
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likely to participate in institutionalised forms of political participation than women (Burns et al. 
2001) whereas women are more inclined to engage in non-institutionalised forms of political 
participation than men (Micheletti 2003; Stolle and Hooghe 2011). Furthermore, age represents 
an important control variable that is expected to have a different effect on political engagement 
depending on the form of participation. We know that older citizens are more likely to become 
active in institutionalised forms of political participation (Putnam 2000; Verba et al. 1995) 
whereas younger age groups have a preference for non-institutionalised participation forms 
(Marien et al. 2010; Norris 2002). In addition, we control the level of political interest of 
respondents given that previous research has shown that high levels of political interest are 
positively associated with political participation (Verba et al. 1995). Finally, we include a variable 
that controls for whether a respondent lives in an urban or a rural region, with the expectation 
that especially with respect to non-institutionalised political participation, urbanites are more 
exposed to those types of activities.  
It has to be remembered, however, that we are not interested in explaining the absolute level of 
political participation, but rather in explaining the changes that occur as a result of the ongoing 
economic crisis. Therefore, on the country-level we introduce a variable that controls for the 
previous levels of institutionalised and non-institutionalised participation. These variables 
represent the country-average of respectively institutionalised and non-institutionalised 
participation over the past ESS rounds and therefore allow to include a control for the standard 
level of participation in each country. With the inclusion of the average level of political 
participation from previous years we essentially complement our logistic multilevel model with 
the characteristics of a conditional change model (Menard 2007). This allows us to investigate to 
what extent the level of participation in 2010 deviates from the previous average levels for that 
country, as we assume these changes can be related to the financial and economic crisis. In doing 
so, we control indirectly for other country-level variables that might affect political participation, 
which is why this procedure also represents a very conservative and at the same time 
parsimonious approach. Only what cannot be traced back to the standard background level of 
political participation in a country remains as object of study. The test is conservative, as it will 
detect only significant deviations in the 2008-2010 period and effects with a more limited 
amplitude will not lead to significant results. More detailed information about all variables that 
are included in this analysis can be found in Appendix. 
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Results 
First, we analyse changes over the entire 2002-2010 observation period for institutionalised 
participation (Models I-III in Table 2). We start the analyses with a null model (Model I) in which 
the variance in institutionalised political participation is split into two components: the variance 
between the respondents within each country (individual-level variance,  σe
2) and the variance 
between the different country observations (country-level variance,  σu0
2 ).4 The results indicate 
that the lion’s share of the variance in institutionalised participation is found on the individual 
level (93.8 per cent of the entire variance). Only 6.2 per cent of the variance in institutionalised 
participation is found on the second level, which accounts for the variance between the different 
countries and the variance between the different time points. This means that individual 
characteristics are much more important in explaining institutionalised participation than 
country-level characteristics.  
The results of this analysis are in line with previous research as it shows that men and the highly 
politically interested respondents are more active in this form of political participation. For age 
we find a curvilinear effect, meaning that the probability to participate rises throughout 
adolescence and early adulthood, peaks in the middle-age groups and falls again with older age. 
Students also tend to be significantly more active in institutionalised participation. Regarding our 
variables of interest we find that both the higher educated and the ones who are more satisfied 
with their household income are more likely to become active in institutionalised forms of 
political participation, which is in line with the civic voluntarism model. Satisfaction with the 
economy and unemployment, which serve as indicators for individual deprivation, do not affect 
the probability to become engaged in institutionalised political participation. Turning to the 
country level, it can be observed that the changes with regard to unemployment and with regard 
to GDP/capita are not significantly related to levels of institutionalised participation. As such, 
there is no support for the deprivation theory and only limited support at the individual level for 
the civic voluntarism model. When including the year of the survey as an independent variable it 
can be observed there is a downward trend over time. 
Subsequently, in Models IV-VI of Table 2 we turn to non-institutionalised participation. The null 
model (Model IV) shows that, compared to institutionalised political participation, clearly more 
variance of non-institutionalised forms of political participation is found on the second level, 
namely about 18 per cent ( σu0
2 = 0.721,  σe
2 = 3.29). Country-level variables play thus a more 
important role for explaining non-institutionalised forms of political engagement and this too is 
in line with previous research (Hooghe and Quintelier 2013).  
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Table 2. The effect of economic development on political participation (2002-2010) 
 
  Probability of Political Participation  
 Institutionalised Non-institutionalised  
 I II III IV V VI 
Overall intercept -2.679*** -6.815*** -6.769*** -1.120*** -4.535*** -4.662*** 
 (0.092) (0.173) (0.170) (0.167) (0.102) (0.100) 
Individual-level variables  
Sex (Male = 1)  0.240*** 0.240***  -0.197*** -0.196*** 
  (0.019) (0.019)  (0.011) (0.011) 
Age  0.024*** 0.024***  0.040*** 0.040*** 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Age2  -0.000** -0.000**  -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Interest  0.930*** 0.930***  0.533*** 0.534*** 
  (0.012) (0.012)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Urbanization  -0.166*** -0.166***  0.084*** 0.083*** 
  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.005) 
Satisfaction with income  0.063*** 0.063***  0.041*** 0.041*** 
  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.008) (0.008) 
Level of education(+) 
Primary education  -0.086* -0.087*  -0.423*** -0.421*** 
  (0.035) (0.035)  (0.022) (0.022) 
Tertiary education  0.216*** 0.215***  0.453*** 0.454*** 
  (0.022) (0.022)  (0.013) (0.013) 
Satisfaction with economy  0.005 0.005  -0.046*** -0.047*** 
  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Position within labour force(++)  
Student  0.319*** 0.319***  0.442*** 0.446*** 
  (0.048) (0.048)  (0.025) (0.025) 
Unemployed  -0.051 -0.051  -0.133*** -0.130*** 
  (0.049) (0.049)  (0.026) (0.026) 
Not in labour force  -0.174*** -0.174***  -0.146*** -0.146*** 
  (0.028) (0.028)  (0.016) (0.016) 
Year (+++)       
2004  -0.068 -0.104***  -0.082*** 0.016 
  (0.038) (0.031)  (0.023) (0.019) 
2006  -0.054 -0.103**  -0.109*** 0.015 
  (0.045) (0.032)  (0.027) (0.019) 
2008  -0.157** -0.232***  -0.282*** -0.103*** 
  (0.059) (0.031)  (0.036) (0.018) 
2010  -0.230*** -0.300***  -0.262*** -0.077*** 
  (0.052) (0.032)  (0.031) (0.019) 
Country-level variables  
Average institutionalised   14.465*** 14.499***    
participation (2002-2010)  (1.787) (1.797)    
Average non-institutionalised     5.511*** 5.542*** 
participation (2002-2010)     (0.259) (0.259) 
Δ GDP per capita  -0.000   0.001***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)  
Δ Unemployment rate   0.003   -0.015*** 
   (0.006)   (0.003) 
       
 σu0
2  0.216 0.066 0.067 0.721 0.041 0.041 
Deviance 96,426 87,039 87,041 217,560 201,476 201,494 
Note: The dependent variable is the probability to engage in institutionalised (Model I-III) and in non-
institutionalised (Model IV -VI) forms of political participation. Entries are logit coefficients and standard errors (in 
parentheses) of a multilevel logistic regression. Models I - III include 200,093 individuals on the first level and 
models IV - VI include 200,653 individuals on the first level. All models include 26 countries on the second level. (+) 
The reference category is secondary education. (++) The reference category is in paid work. (+++)  The reference 
category is 2002. Sign.: * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001.  
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Here too, we can observe that especially the highly educated and those who are satisfied with 
their income tend to participate in these activities. However, those who are dissatisfied with the 
state of the economy are also more likely to participate and this is a marked difference between 
this analysis for non-institutionalised participation compared to the previous analysis on 
institutionalised participation. Additionally, and in line with the civic voluntarism model, the 
unemployed are significantly less likely to become engaged in this form of political participation 
compared to those that are in paid work. Turning to the country level, we find that a rise in 
GDP/capita levels is positively associated with political participation, while a rise in 
unemployment levels is negatively associated with the participation levels. Both the results on the 
individual as on the country-level are therefore in line with the third hypothesis, and they support 
the civic voluntarism model. If more resources become available across society (as seen by the 
rising level of GDP/capita), apparently citizens use these resources to participate more strongly 
in politics.  
A counter-argument, however, could be that the observation period that is included in the 
analysis reported in Table 2 is too long to allow us to gather insights into what has specifically 
happened following the economic crisis that erupted in 2008. Indeed, most observations in this 
dataset are based on surveys that were conducted during ‘normal’ economic circumstances. To 
address this concern, we repeat the analysis, but this time taking into account only the 2010 data. 
This test allows us to ascertain whether the suddenness of the imposed grievances indeed has an 
effect. If the economic crisis would have had any effect on participation levels, it is most likely 
that we would find these effects in the year 2010. In order to be able to test the hypotheses, we 
present the results of a number of logistic multilevel analyses in the following section. We present 
first the results of the analysis that includes institutionalised political participation as a dependent 
variable (Table 3) before we continue with an analysis of non-institutionalised political 
participation (Table 4).  
We start the analysis by including all control variables in the regression analysis (Table 3, Model 
I). The results confirm previous studies. Comparing the effect of the individual level variables in 
2010 with the effect of the individual variables in the previous analysis based on the full set of 
survey data for the period 2002-2010, we find that age and being a student no longer affect the 
probability to become engaged in 2010. Also regarding the variables of interest we find some 
changes compared to the analysis that covered the period from 2002 to 2010. For the level of 
education, only tertiary education seems to matter. Those with primary education are no longer 
less likely to engage compared to those with secondary education. Also, satisfaction with income 
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has no longer a significant effect on institutionalized political participation. Satisfaction with the 
economy and unemployment still does not seem to play a role in explaining the probability to 
become involved in this form of political participation. Regarding the country-level, just like in 
Table 2, we do not observe a significant effect of changes in the unemployment level (Model II) 
in society. And also the change in GDP per capita between 2009 and 2010 does not affect the 
probability to become active in an institutionalised manner (Model III). We can thus conclude 
that institutionalised political participation has neither been affected by a country’s general 
economic development from 2002 up to 2010 nor by the economic crisis.  
In a next step, we repeat the same analysis for non-institutionalised political participation (Table 
4). First, we introduce the control variables (Model I). The results confirm what we have found in 
Table 2, as women are more likely to engage in non-institutionalised forms than men. According 
to expectations, urbanites are more likely to participate. Subsequently, the variables of interest 
and two crisis variables at the country level are – one by one – added to the regression analysis. 
On the individual level, we find that the level of education and satisfaction with income positively 
affect the probability to become engaged, which can be counted as evidence for the civic 
voluntarism model. However, independent of the other personal characteristics, respondents 
who are less satisfied with the state of the economy are more likely to become engaged, which is 
in line with individual deprivation. Concerning the unemployed we find that the long-term 
unemployed are significantly less likely to take action that those who are in paid work. Yet, this is 
not the case for those who became only recently unemployed (potentially because of the crisis), 
which is again in line with individual deprivation. Looking at the contextual effects, the change in 
GDP per capita is introduced in Model III, but this proves to be not significant. The change in 
unemployment rates between 2009 and 2010 (Model II), on the other hand, has a positive effect 
on non-institutionalised participation and this supports the grievance theory and thereby the first 
hypothesis. This supports the claim that collective relative deprivation is positively related to 
political action, independent of the individual situation of the respondent for which we control. 
So for this in-depth analysis of 2010, we arrive at different conclusions than for the overview of 
the entire 2002-2010 period, and here the results are more in line with grievance theory. 
Apparently, an acute phase of economic downturn can have different effects than what we 
observed for the entire 2002-2010 period, as these suddenly imposed grievances seem to have a 
direct effect on participation levels.  
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Table 3. The effect of the economic crisis on institutionalised political participation in 
2010 
 
Probability of Institutionalised Political Participation 
 I II III 
Overall intercept -6.445*** -6.579*** -6.557*** 
 (0.218)  (0.269) (0.266) 
Individual-level variables    
Sex (Male= 1) 0.298*** 0.290*** 0.290*** 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) 
Age 0.010 0.008 0.008 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age2 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political interest 0.997*** 0.959*** 0.959*** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) 
Urbanization -0.136*** -0.154*** -0.153*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Satisfaction with income  0.035 0.034 
  (0.028) (0.028) 
Level of education(+)    
Primary education  -0.104 -0.119 
  (0.078) (0.079) 
Tertiary education  0.258*** 0.255*** 
  (0.047) (0.046) 
Satisfaction with economy  0.016 0.017 
  (0.010) (0.010) 
Position within labour force(++)    
Student  0.111 0.112 
  (0.108) (0.108) 
Unemployed (< two years)  -0.165 -0.165 
  (0.116) (0116) 
Unemployed (> two years)  -0.441 -0.442 
  (0.257) (0.257) 
Not in labour force   -0.153* -0.155* 
  (0.062) (0.062) 
Country-level variables    
Average institutionalised participation 11.918*** 11.334*** 12.108*** 
(2002-2008) (1.677) (1.713) (1.730) 
Change in unemployment (2009-2010)  0.065  
  (0.044)  
Change in GDP per capita    -0.004 
(2009-2010)   (0.002) 
    
 σu0
2  0.062 0.064 0.062 
    
Deviance 18,668 18,600 18,599 
Note: The dependent variable is the probability to engage in institutionalised forms of political participation: The 
probability to participate in no activity (=0), the probability to participate in at least one activity (=1). Entries are 
logit coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of a multilevel logistic regression. All models include 46,882 
individuals on the first level and 26 countries on the second level. (+) The reference category is secondary education. 
(++) The reference category is in paid work. Sign.: * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001.  
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Following the double deprivation theory (Foster and Matheson 1995; Runciman 1966), we would 
expect that in countries that were strongly affected by the crisis, those individuals are particularly 
motivated to become active, who suffer also personally under the consequences of the economic 
crisis. Consequently, we tested whether the effects of satisfaction with the economy and being 
unemployed since less than two years on non-institutionalized political participation vary across 
the 26 countries. For satisfaction with the economy, this is indeed the case. We therefore 
included two cross-level interactions to evaluate whether this variance can be explained by the 
country’s economic situation. The effect of satisfaction with the economy on participation 
should, according to this argumentation, be particularly strong in counties that were severely 
affected, as in those countries ‘the personal becomes political’ (Foster and Matheson 1995, 1168). 
However, Model IV and V as well as the plotted interactions (see Figure A, Appendix) show that 
the cross-level interactions were not significant, indicating that there is no evidence for the 
double deprivation theory. The analysis seems to suggest that collective relative deprivation also 
works independently of an individual’s personal situation.   
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Table 4. The effect of the economic crisis on non-institutionalised political participation 
in 2010 
 
 Probability of Non-Institutionalised Political Participation 
 I II III IV V 
Overall intercept -4.648*** -5.014*** -4.806*** -4.981*** -4.804*** 
 (0.158) (0.199) (0.188) (0.206) (0.193) 
Individual-level variables      
Sex (Male= 1) -0.155*** -0.137*** -0.138*** -0.140*** -0.140*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Age 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political interest 0.588*** 0.515*** 0.515*** 0.515*** 0.515*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Urbanization 0.110*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Satisfaction with income  0.043** 0.045** 0.040* 0.040* 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Level of education(+)      
Primary education  -0.470*** -0.471*** -0.475*** -0.476*** 
  (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Tertiary education  0.482*** 0.481*** 0.478*** 0.478*** 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Satisfaction with economy  -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.065*** -0.055*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.010) 
Position within labour force(++)      
Student  0.475*** 0.475*** 0.475*** 0.476*** 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Unemployed (< two years)  -0.036 -0.035 -0.035 -0.033 
  (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Unemployed (> two years)  -0.329** -0.327** -0.312* -0.311* 
  (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) 
Not in labour force   -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.131*** 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Country-level variables      
Average non-institutionalised  4.888*** 5.495*** 5.353*** 5.583*** 5.389*** 
participation (2002-2008) (0.403) (0.415) (0.462) (0.428) (0.472) 
Change in unemployment   0.152**    
(2009 – 2010)  (0.054)    
Change in GDP per capita   -0.004  -0.001 
(2009-2010)   (0.003)  (0.003) 
      
Cross-level interaction      
Satisfaction with economy *     0.007  
Change in unemployment     (0.009)  
(2009 – 2010)      
Satisfaction with economy *     -0.001 
Change in GDP per capita     (0.000) 
(2009-2010)      
      
 σu0
2  0.101 0.093 0.113 0.122 0.146 
 σSatisfaction  with economy
2     0.002 0.002 
      
Deviance 45,967 45,265 45,270 45,240 45,244 
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Note: The dependent variable is the probability to engage in non-institutionalised forms of political participation: The 
probability to participate in no activity (=0), the probability to participate in at least one activity (=1). Entries are 
logit coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of a multilevel logistic regression. All models include 46,984 
individuals on the first level and 26 countries on the second level. (+) The reference category is secondary education. 
(++) The reference category is in paid work. Sign.: * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001.  
 
 
Discussion 
In this paper we seized upon the opportunity offered by the recent economic crisis to investigate 
the effect of economic hardship on participation levels in Europe. Within the literature, two 
alternative theoretical frameworks provide insights on the way economic indicators might be 
related to participation. While the grievance model suggests that (relative) deprivation will lead to 
more participation, the civic voluntarism model argues that material resources are an essential 
prerequisite for participation. As we started from an agnostic point of view, we developed the 
analysis in such a manner that we could detect whether economic downturn has a positive or a 
negative effect on participation levels. 
In a first step, covering the entire 2002-2010 observation period, the findings tend to support the 
civic voluntarism model, as a countries’ rising prosperity levels were associated with higher levels 
of non-institutionalised political participation. This is also supported on the individual level as an 
individual’s resources (i.e. the level of education and satisfaction with income) are positively 
related to political participation. Apparently, if resources are abundant, citizens will devote at least 
some of their resources to various acts of political participation. In this regard, it is theoretically 
relevant that this effect is significant for non-institutionalised participation. Theorists on value 
change, from Inglehart on, have always claimed that affluent, self-expressive generations will 
develop a preference for non-institutionalised forms of participation, as these forms are much 
better adapted for expressing their value patterns. Covering a longer period of time, and a large 
amount of data, therefore these results tend to support the civic voluntarism model. 
Following up on the argument that the financial crisis that developed from 2008 onwards should 
be considered as highly exceptional, in a second step, we investigated the participation levels in 
the year 2010, when the 5th wave of the European Social Survey was conducted. At that moment, 
numerous European societies were confronted with rapidly rising unemployment levels. Indeed, 
when we only look at the 2010 figures, results are not in line with what we find for the overall 
observation period. In 2010 there is a strong positive relation between the rise in unemployment 
levels in the preceding year and levels of non-institutionalised political participation. A rapid 
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growth in unemployment levels, therefore, seems to be associated with a wave of protest 
behaviour and other forms of participation as a result of these suddenly imposed grievances. It is 
difficult to understand this phenomenon from a civic voluntarism model: as unemployment rises, 
most citizens will have fewer material resources that would allow them to participate, while in 
reality we find a positive relation. The grievance model, on the other hand, can explain this trend 
as it can be assumed that a lot of this protest behaviour actually was directed at government 
policies with regard to unemployment. From a grievance perspective, therefore, citizens clearly 
felt deprived, and they wanted to convey a message about their grievance to national and supra-
national political decision-makers. In this process, collective relative deprivation seems to play a 
particularly important role. These suddenly imposed grievances seem to operate mainly on the 
collective level: citizens in countries with a substantial rise in unemployment become more 
inclined to participate in a non-institutional manner - regardless of their own individual level of 
satisfaction with the economy or unemployment status.  
While we set up this paper as a test between two alternative theoretical frameworks, the results of 
the analysis reveal a more complex reality. An analysis covering a longer period of time provides 
the strongest support for the civic voluntarism model, while a more specific analysis on one 
specific survey wave, in the middle of the economic crisis, tends to be more in line with grievance 
theory. How can these findings be reconciled? Self-evidently, it has to be acknowledged that the 
first analysis on the entire period 2002-2010 should be considered as more robust, for the simple 
reason that more observation points could be included. It does look promising to consider the 
civic voluntarism model as a baseline model if we want to explain structural and long term 
determinants of participation levels. Those that are well off have more resources that they can 
also use to participate. This holds at the individual level, as we have seen that those with high 
educational credentials and those who are more satisfied with their income tend to participate 
more intensively, while the unemployed tend to be more passive with regard to non-
institutionalised political participation. This also holds at the country level, as most of the 
previous research has shown that participation levels are much higher in the wealthy countries of 
Europe than in those with a lower GDP/capita level. The current analysis suggests that this also 
holds on a longitudinal level, as an increase in income levels is associated with higher levels of 
non-institutionalised participation. The exception we find to this pattern is that citizens who are 
less satisfied with the state of the economy are more likely to become involved in non-
institutionalized manners. Apparently engaged citizens are characterized by a combination of 
resources and dissatisfaction on the individual level. 
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When we focus on the 2010 data, however, a different picture emerges as now the grievance 
theory is supported, especially with regard to unemployment. It has to be remembered that 
especially in 2009 unemployment levels rose in a very dramatic manner in numerous European 
societies. Public opinion reacted rather strongly to this sudden rise, with as a consequence a 
significant rise in levels of non-institutionalised participation. When interpreting these findings, it 
has to be kept in mind, however, that the 2009 rise in unemployment was highly exceptional and 
for some countries even historically unprecedented. Apparently, public opinion reacts rather 
strongly to this kind of shock experiences, and this can lead to more protest, as could be clearly 
observed in countries like Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece and France. This kind of dramatic and 
sudden changes can indeed lead to the occurrence of ‘suddenly imposed grievances’ (Walsh 1981) 
and this kind of shock apparently can overcome the standard pattern of a positive relation 
between resources and participatory behaviour. In the long run, however, it needs to be stressed 
that this kind of behaviour is highly exceptional and our findings suggest that it indeed requires a 
highly unusual level of grievances in order to have an effect on participation levels. Moreover, 
while deprivation can explain our findings on the country-level, on the individual level we find 
again a combination of deprivation and resources. Both the education level as dissatisfaction with 
the state of the economy have a positive effect on participation levels.  
The sudden impact of an economic crisis clearly seems to lead to protest behaviour. Such an 
argumentation is in line with what has been described as ‘suddenly imposed grievances’. Walsh 
(1981, 18) for instance suggests that ‘the aggrieved collectively must have some threshold level of 
resources able to be activated when perceived grievances increase dramatically.’ Simultaneously, it 
can be argued that the shock of the unprecedented rise in unemployment is so strong that actors 
do mobilize against it, while they would not necessarily do the same if a society is confronted 
with endemically high levels of unemployment. Our results are therefore in line with previous 
research on social movement mobilisation, indicating that moral shocks, exactly because of their 
sudden impact on collective resources and social norms can lead to protest waves (Jasper and 
Poulsen 1995; Jasper 1999; Walgrave and Manssens 2000). In general, however, it does remain 
difficult to use these moral shocks or suddenly imposed grievances to construct long term 
periods of enduring mobilisation and high participation levels. 
It has to be acknowledged that this is a rather speculative way to explain our findings. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that there might not be a singly Holy Grail in our quest to 
investigate the relation between economic indicators and participation levels. In fact, our finding 
suggest that both theoretical approaches can help us to solve part of this research problem and in 
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this case, we align ourselves with the work of Wilkes (2004) who also argued that both 
approaches should be combined. The available evidence of our longitudinal analysis suggests that 
the civic voluntarism model could be considered as a kind of default explanation for political 
participation, as in a vast majority of research there is positive association between material status 
and participatory behaviour. Only in the case of sudden and highly impactful shocks, we might 
speculate that grievance theory offers a better explanation for the occurrence of mostly protest 
behaviour. Almost by definition, however, these sudden shocks will be exceptional in most 
societies. 
Obviously, further research is necessary to ascertain whether this explanation is valid. It should 
be further investigated whether the findings of this study indeed can be generalized to other 
shock experiences of comparable magnitude. Longitudinal research should also be able to 
ascertain whether these effects of external shocks are indeed limited in time, and after a certain 
period of time give way to the ‘default’ civic voluntarism model. Indeed, looking at it from a 
historical perspective, there are hardly any examples of societies where endemically high levels of 
economic hardship and unemployment were associated with equally high and stable levels of 
protest behaviour. Looking back at the first formulations of the grievance theory, it can be 
observed that they deal with highly exceptional cases of hardship and protest. While looking at 
civic voluntarism as a good weather theory, while grievance theory would be better equipped for 
rough and stormy periods in a country’s history, might be intuitively appealing, it is clear that 
further research is necessary to ascertain whether both theoretical approaches can indeed be 
combined in such a manner.  
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Appendix 
Table A: Descriptive statistics of variables included in the analysis of political 
participation from 2002 to 2010 (Table 2) 
Variable 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max. 
Missings 
in % 
Dependent Variable       
Institutionalised Political  218,774 0.066 0.248 0 1 0.62 
Participation       
Non-institutionalised 217,970 0.290 0.454 0 1 0.99 
Political Participation       
Individual-Level Variables       
Sex (Male =1) 219,869 0.460 0.498 0 1 0.12 
Age 218,965 47.633 18.557 13 123 0.53 
Level of Education       
 Primary Education 219,016 0.142 0.349 0 1 0.51 
 Secondary Education  219,016 0.594 0.491 0 1 0.51 
(Ref.)       
 Tertiary Education 219,016 0.264 0.441 0 1 0.51 
Satisfaction with income 214,079 2.895 0.896 1 4 2.75 
Political Interest 219,463 2.369 0.904 1 4 0.31 
Position within labour force       
 In paid work (Ref.) 216,296 0.494 0.500 0 1 1.75 
 Student 216,296 0.087 0.282 0 1 1.75 
 Unemployed 216,296 0.056 0.229 0 1 1.75 
 Not in labour force 216,296 0.363 0.481 0 1 1.75 
Urbanization 219,386 3.126 1.229 1 5 0.34 
Satisfaction with economy 214,271 4.292 2.504 0 10 2.67 
Country-Level Variables       
Δ GDP per capita 26 1.446 75.551 -277.381 251.600 0 
Δ Unemployment rate 26 -0.086 2.224 -6.733 7.978 0 
Average Institutionalised  26 0.066 0.026 0.024 0.148 0 
Participation (2002-2010)       
Average Non- 26 0.290 0.157 0.083 0.579 0 
Institutionalised       
Participation (2002-2010)       
Note: In total, the dataset contains 220,140 respondents in 26 countries.  
Source: ESS Cumulative Data Round 1- Round 5 (2010). 
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Table B: Descriptive statistics of variables included in the analysis of political 
participation from 2010 (Tables 3 and 4) 
 
Variable 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max. 
Missings 
in % 
Dependent Variable       
Institutionalised Political 
Participation 
50,560 0.058 0.235 0 1 0.44 
Non-institutionalised 
Political Participation 
50,405 0.256 0.436 0 1 0.74 
       
Individual-Level Variables       
Sex (Male =1) 50,760 0.457 0.498 0 1 0.04 
Age 50,669 48.380 18.762 14 102 0.22 
Level of Education       
 Primary Education 50,536 0.132 0.338 0 1 0.48 
 Secondary Education  50,536 0.592 0.491 0 1 0.48 
(Ref.)       
 Tertiary Education 50,536 0.276 0.447 0 1 0.48 
Satisfaction with income 50,112 2.800 0.928 1 4 1.32 
Political Interest 50,525 2.318 0.921 1 4 0.50 
Position within labour force       
 In paid work (Ref.) 50,128 0.467 0.499 0 1 1.29 
 Student 50,128 0.090 0.286 0 1 1.29 
 Unemployed (< 2 years) 49,450 0.048 0.213 0 1 2.62 
Unemployed (> 2 years) 49,450 0.012 0.108 0 1 2.62 
 Not in labour force 50,128 0.371 0.483 0 1 1.29 
Urbanization 50,681 3.174 1.247 1 5 0.20 
Satisfaction with economy 49,661 3.913 2.522 0 10 2.21 
Country-Level Variables       
Change in unemployment rate 26 1.000 1.296 -1 3.4 0 
(2009-2010)       
Change in GDP per capita 26 2.293 24.877 -40.677 76.981 0 
(2009-2010)       
Average Institutionalised  26 0.070 0.029 0.023 0.161 0 
Participation (2002-2008)       
Average Non- 26 0.271 0.154 0.081 0.587 0 
Institutionalised       
Participation (2002-2008)       
Note: In total, the dataset contains 50,781 respondents in 26 countries.  
Source: ESS Round 5: European Social Survey Round 5 Data 2010. 
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Figure A. Marginal effect of satisfaction with the economy on the probability to become 
involved in non-institutionalized political participation depending on change in 
economic indicators 
 
Note: Effect of satisfaction with the economy on the probability of non-institutionalized political participation, 
depending on change in economic indicators, 2009-2010. Other continuous covariates and sex are set at the sample 
mean, categorical variables are set to their mode. Simulations were used to obtain confidence bands. 
  
26 
 
References 
Anduiza, E., Christanco, C. & Cabusedo, J. (2013). Mobilization through online social networks: the 
political protest of the indignados in Spain. Information, Communication, and Society, 17(6), 750–764. 
Appelgryn, A. E. M. & Nieuwoudt, J. M. (1988). Relative Deprivation and the Ethnic Attitudes of Blacks 
and Afrikaans-Speaking Whites in South Africa. Journal of Social Psychology, 128(3), 311–23. 
Barnes, S. H., Farah, B. G. & Heunks, F. (1979). Personal Dissatisfaction. In Barnes, S. H. & Kaase, M. 
(Eds.), Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies (pp. 381–407). Beverly Hills: Sage. 
Barnes, S. H. & Kaase M. (Eds.) (1979). Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies. Beverly 
Hills: Sage. 
de Beer, P. (2012). Earnings and Income Inequality in the EU During the Crisis. International Labour Review, 
151(4), 313–31. 
Berinsky, A. J. (2002). Silent Voices: Social Welfare Policy Opinions and Political Equality in America. 
American Journal of Political Science, 46(2), 276–87. 
Brady, H. E., Verba S. & Schlozman, K. L. (1995). Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political 
Participation. American Political Science Review, 89(2), 271–94. 
Buechler, S. (1993). Beyond Resource Mobilization? Sociological Quarterly, 34(2), 217-235. 
Burns, N., Schlozman, K. L. & Verba, S. (2001). The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and 
Political Participation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Dalton, R. J. (1996). Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies. 
Chatham, N.J: Chatham House. 
Dalton, R. J. (2000). Citizen Attitudes and Political Behaviour. Comparative Political Studies, 33(6-7), 912–40. 
De Grauwe, P. & Ji, Y. (2013). From Panic-Driven Austerity to Symmetric Macroeconomic Policies in the 
Eurozone. Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(S1), 31-41. 
ESS. 2010. European Social Survey Cumulative File: Wave 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Norwegian Social Science Data 
Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data. available from: 
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/downloadwizard/ [last access 20 December 2012].. 
Folger, R. (1986). Rethinking Equity Theory: A Referent Cognition Model. In Bierhoff, H.-W. & Cohen, 
R. L. (Eds.), Justice in Social Relations (pp. 145-162). New York: Plenum. 
Foster, M. & Matheson, K. (1995). Double Relative Deprivation: Combining the Personal and Political. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 1167-1177. 
Gamson, W. A. (1968). Power and Discontent. Homewood: Dorsey Press. 
Geschwender, J. A. (1968). Explorations in the Theory of Social Movements and Revolutions. Social Forces, 
47(2), 127–35. 
Gorsuch, R. L. (1974). Factor Analysis. Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders. 
27 
 
Gurr, T. R. (1970). Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton Universtiy Press. 
Hooghe, M. (2012). Taking to the Streets. Economic Crises and Youth Protest in Europe. Harvard 
International Review, 34(2), 34-38. 
Hooghe, M. & Quintelier, E. (2014). Political Participation in European Countries: The Effect of 
Authoritarian Rule, Corruption, Lack of Good Governance and Economic Downturn. Comparative 
European Politics, 12(2), 209-232. 
Japser, J. M. & Poulsen, J. D. (1995). Recruiting Strangers and Friends: Moral Shocks and Social Networks 
in Animal Rights and Anti-Nuclear Protests. Social Problems, 42(4): 493-542. 
Jasper, J. M. (1999). The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.Kawakami, K. & Dion, K. L. (1995). Social Identity and Affect as 
Determinants of Collective Action: Toward an Integration of Relative Deprivation and Social 
Identity Theories. Theory & Psychology, 5(4), 551–77. 
Kelly, C. & Breinlinger, S. (1996). The Social Psychology of Collective Action: Identity, Injustice, and Gender. 
London: Taylor & Francis. 
Kinder, D. R. & Kiewiet, D. R. (1979). Economic Discontent and Political Behaviour: The Role of 
Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting. American Journal 
of Political Science, 23(3), 495–527. 
Klandermans, B. (1997). The Social Psychology of Protest. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Klandermans, B., Roefs, M. & Olivier, J. (2001). Grievance Formation in a Country in Transition: South 
Africa, 1994-1998. Social Psychology Quarterly, 64(1), 41–54. 
Klandermans, B., van der Toorn, J. & van Stekelenburg, J. (2008). Embeddedness and Identity: How 
Immigrants Turn Grievances into Action. American Sociological Review, 73(6), 992–1012. 
Kriesi, H. 2012. The Political Consequences of the Financial and Economic Crisis in Europe: Electoral 
Punishment and Popular Protest. Swiss Political Science Review, 18(4), 518-522. 
Lynn, P. 2003. Developing Quality Standards for Cross-National Survey Research: Five Approaches. 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 6(4), 323–36. 
Marien, S., Hooghe M. & Quintelier, E. (2010). Inequalities in Non-Institutionalised Forms of Political 
Participation: A Multi-Level Analysis of 25 Countries. Political Studies, 58(1), 187–213. 
McCarthy, J. & Zald, M. (1977). Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. American 
Journal of Sociology, 82(6), 1212-1241. 
Menard, S. (2007). Handbook of Longitudinal Research: Design, Measurement, and Analysis. Amsterdam: 
Academic press. 
Micheletti, M. (2003). Political Virtue and Shopping: Individuals, Consumerism, and Collective Action. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Muñoz, J., Rico, G. & Anduiza, E. (2014). Empowering cuts? Austerity policies and political involvement 
in Spain. In Kumlin, S. & Stadelmann-Steffen, I. (Eds.), How Welfare States Shape the Democratic Public: 
Policy Feedback, Participation, Voting and Attitudes (pp. 19-40). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
28 
 
Norris, P. (2002). Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Obershall, A. (1973). Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. 
Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & 
Schuster. 
Runciman, W. G. (1966). Relative Deprivation and Social Justice: A Study of Attitudes to Social Inequality in 
Twentieth-Century England. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Schlozman, K. L., Verba, S. & Brady, H. E. (1999). Civic Participation and the Equality Problem. In 
Skocpol, T. & Fiorina, M. P. (Eds.), Civic Engagement in American Democracy (pp. 427-460). 
Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press. 
Smith, H. J. & Ortiz, D. J. (2002). Is It Just Me?: The Different Consequences of Personal and Group 
Relative Deprivation. In Walker, I. & Smith, H. J. (Eds.), Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development, 
and Integration (p.91-155). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Snijders, T. A. B. & Bosker, R. J. (1999). Multilevel Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Multilevel 
Modeling. London: Sage. 
Steenbergen, M. R. & Jones, B. S. (2002). Modeling Multilevel Data Structures. American Journal of Political 
Science, 46(1), 218–37. 
Van Aelst, P. & Walgrave, S. (2001). Who Is That (wo)man in the Street? From the Normalisation of 
Protest to the Normalisation of the Protester. European Journal of Political Research, 39(4), 461–86. 
Van Dyke, N. & Soule, S. A. (2002). Structural Social Change and the Mobilizing Effect of Threat: 
Explaining Levels of Patriot and Militia Organizing in the United States. Social Problems, 49(4), 497-
520. 
Van Stekelenburg, J. & Klandermans, B. (2013). The Social Psychology of Protest. Current Sociology, 61(5), 
886–905. 
Stolle, D. & Hooghe, M. (2011). Shifing Inequalities. European Societies, 13(1), 119–42. 
Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L. & Brady, H. E. (1995). Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Verick, S. (2009). Who Is Hit Hardest During a Financial Crisis? The Vulnerability of Young Men and 
Women to Unemployment in an Economic Downturn. IZA Discussion Paper 4959. 
Walgrave, S. & Manssens, J. (2000). The Making of The White March: The Mass Media as a Mobilizing 
Alternative to Movement Organizations. Mobilization, 5(2): 217 – 239.  
Walsh, E. J. (1981). Resource Mobilization and Citizen Protest in Communities around Three Mile Island. 
Social Problems, 29(1): 1-21. 
Wilkes, R. (2004). First Nation Politics: Deprivation, Resources, and Participation in Collective Action. 
Sociological Inquiry, 74(4), 570–89. 
World Bank. (2014). World Development Indicators. Available from: http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators [last access: 12.02.2014]. 
29 
 
 
                                                          
Endnotes 
1 It has to be noted that in the 2012 ESS questionnaire, the question about being a member of a 
political party was no longer included. Therefore it was not possible to include the results of the 
2012 wave in this analysis. 
2
 In particular, this variable captures the potential future labour force, as it comprises not only 
respondents who indicated that they are in education but also respondents who are in community 
or military service. 
3
 This variable includes respondents who indicate that they are permanently sick or disabled, 
retired, or doing housework, looking after children or other persons. 
4 The error variance in logit models is fixed to Var(ε|x)= π2/3. Respectively, the first –level residual 
variance  σe
2 in multilevel logit models is by assumption σ𝑒
2= π2/3 ≈ 3.29 (Snijders and Bosker 
1999, 225). 
